1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. Use this button to switch between dark and light mode. As the State puts it, "[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs." Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 No. Respondents argue that accepting the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its October 14 order in this case risks confusion in future cases and invites the lower courts to pick and choose between those parties whose "petitions for rehearing in banc" they view favorably and wish to give additional time for seeking review in this Court, and those whose petitions they wish to give no such aid. [ The statutory limitation, therefore, could be disregarded and the city ordered to levy the necessary taxes to pay its bonds. Missouri V Jenkins Case Brief Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins Case Citation: 491 U.S. 274 (1989) Supreme Court of The United States FACTS: An appeal to the Supreme Court for a case against a defendant promoting racial segregation within a school district in Missouri. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 406 As we have said, "[t]axation is a legislative function, and Congress . An adjustment for delay in payment is an appropriate factor in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee under. ] The old cases recognized two exceptions to this rule, neither of which is relevant here. U.S. 358 Cf. No. 1 A court can direct a local government body to levy. 495 U. S. 45-50. The District Court was candid to acknowledge that the "long term goal of this Court's remedial order is to make available to all KCMSD students educational opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the average Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school district." nor the record support this view. 3. 88-1150. (1915). Appeals "did not require the District Court to reverse the tax increase that it had imposed for prior fiscal years," it "required the District Court to use the less obtrusive procedures beginning with the fiscal year commencing after the remand." (1974) (per curiam); Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., . But we did not there state that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. ] A petition for rehearing is designed to bring to the panel's attention points of law or fact that it may have overlooked. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/515/70/case.html, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2967250?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, San Antonio Indep. There is no occasion in this case to discuss the full implications of Griffin's observation, for it has no application here. 100, 110-111 (1968); see also Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., Furthermore, parties frequently combine a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing in banc in one document incorrectly labeled as a "petition for rehearing in banc," see Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. U.S., at 233 . The Court of Appeals reasoned that permitting the school board to set the levy itself would minimize disruption of state laws and processes and would ensure maximum consideration of the views of state and local officials. U.S. 1, 42 U.S. 33, 76] The taxes were imposed by a District Court that was not "representative" in any sense, and the individual citizens of the KCMSD whose property (they later learned) was at stake were neither served with process nor heard in court. [495 A subsequent order directed that the revenues generated by the property tax increase be used to retire the capital improvement bonds. A year later, the District Court approved KCMSD's proposal to operate six magnet schools during the 1986-1987 school year. But it is discrimination, not the ineptitude of educators or the indifference of the public, that is the evil to be remedied. First, does the Eleventh Amendment prohibit enhancement of a fee award against a State to . 443 No such assurances emerge from today's decision, which endorses federal-court intrusion into these precise matters. While a district court should not grant local government carte blanche, local officials should at least have the opportunity to devise their own solutions to such problems. If we had accepted the State's broader, foundational question going to the magnet school concept, we could also have made an informed decision on whether that element of the District Court's remedial scheme was within the limits of the Court's equitable discretion in response to the constitutional . Article III of the Constitution states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." ] This practice is now reflected in this Court's Rule 13.4: "[I]f a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court by any party in the case, the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari . KCMSD, which had been ordered by the Court to finance 25% of the plan, could not pay its share due to state constitutional and statutory provisions placing a cap . Those hearings would be without principled direction, for there exists no body of juridical axioms by See, e. g., Columbus Bd. Proc. 402 (1975). In this situation, there could be no authority for a judicial order touching on taxation. Every Bundle includes the complete text from each of the titles below: PLUS: Hundreds of law school topic-related videos from Kalima JENKINS et al. Later, on remand in 1993, the district court ordered the state to pay for salary increases for teaching and non-teaching personnel. U.S. 717 Thank you and the best of luck to you on your LSAT exam. U.S. 33, 46] . Law School Case Brief; Missouri v. Jenkins - 491 U.S. 274, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) Rule: An appropriate adjustment for delay in payment--whether by the application of current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise--is within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C.S. The majority addressed a foundational issue in this matter that the parties did not expect to be covered in the Courts limited grant of certiorari. U.S. 187, 196 The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri imposed an increase in the property taxes levied by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) to ensure funding for the desegregation of KCMSD's public schools. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57, 110 S.Ct. Perhaps the KCMSD's Classical Greek theme schools emphasizing forensics and self-government will provide exemplary training in participatory democracy. at 111a, and that apportionment of damages between the State and KCMSD according to fault was supported by the doctrine of comparative fault in tort, which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S. W. 2d 11 (1983). 1. [ [ 2463, 105 L.Ed. In that case, the Court of Appeals treated the "Petition" as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc and allowed the mandate to issue, as it was required to do under Rule 35(c). U.S. 267 of Education v. Doyle, But, as we see it, that is not what happened in this case: the Eighth Circuit originally entered an order denying the "petitions for rehearing en banc" because the papers filed with the court were styled as "petitions for rehearing en banc." (1984); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (in banc), cert. On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two Whatever the merits of this argument when applied to the District Court's own order increasing taxes, a point we have not reached, see supra, at 53, a court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court. Our statement in a case decided more than 100 years ago should apply here. U.S., at 291 If, however, judicial discretion is to provide the sole limit on judicial remedies, that discretion must counsel restraint. Allen R. Snyder argued the cause for respondents. rights or confer new powers. ] The Court of Appeals also relied on Circuit precedent suggesting that a district court could order a property tax increase after exploring every other fiscal alternative. The Kansas City Desegregation Case. A group of local taxpayers (Clark Group) and Jackson County, Missouri, also appealed from an order of the District Court denying their applications to intervene as of right. The income tax surcharge was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. judicial power. 1983 that the Kansas City Missouri School District managed a segregated public institution. More important, this possibility is nothing more or less than the necessary consequence of any limit on judicial power. Opinion Announcement - June 12, 1995. A legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of accountability by making it appear that a decision was reached by elected representatives when the reality is otherwise. 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with Griffin, supra, at 221 (State Constitution amended as part of state and school district plan to resist desegregation). Especially where those institutions are ready, willing, and - but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers - able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves. Accord, Applying County v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F.2d 1301, 1304 (CA5), cert. en banc are denied." The District Court therefore abused its discretion in imposing the tax itself. U.S. 265, 280 1987). These common-law mandamus decisions do not purport to involve the Federal Constitution or remedial powers. [495 Court. The Missouri Constitution states that "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes . Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990, Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall. Cf. 291 (1987). Footnote 13 (1955), observed, local authorities have the "primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving" the problems of desegregation. The goals of the plan were to attract nonminority students to the school district and to provide the minority students in the district an equivalent education to one absent the effects of segregation. The District Court rejected a request by the KCMSD to increase the property tax rate using the method endorsed by the Eighth Circuit from $4 to $4.23 per $100 of assessed valuation. See, e. g., Londoner v. Denver, [495 The Court of Appeals thus required that in the future, the District Court should not set the property tax rate itself but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. (1964). San Antonio Independent School Dist. The amended order stated: We deal first with the question of our own jurisdiction. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). (1906); Credit Co. v. Arkansas Central R. Co., to Pet. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. Pet. U.S. 1, 5 denied, At bottom, today's discussion seems motivated by the fear that failure to endorse judicial taxation power might in some extreme circumstance leave a court unable to remedy a constitutional violation. For this reason, no order of taxation has ever been approved. 493 The Court of Appeals observed that the increases were designed to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district and by reversing "white flight" to the suburbs. U.S. 33, 70] The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's findings of liability and remedial order in most respects. Some commentators agree, stating that Jenkins II brought an end to court-ordered desegregation of schools through reliance on a narrow, case-specific point without a discussion of the precedent from which it seemed to depart. Missouri v. Jenkins Agyei, No. 88-64 - Federal Cases - vLex The majority appears to concede that the Missouri tax law does not violate a specific provision of the Constitution, stating instead that state laws may be disregarded on the basis of a vague "reason based in the Constitution." Id., at 103a. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Zimmern v. United States, It argued that the State should not fund the teacher salary increase, and it should no longer fund the quality education programs because it has achieved partial unitary status, under. If the filing was no more than a suggestion for rehearing in banc, as respondents insist, the petition for certiorari was untimely. 403 U.S. 294, 300 Justice Souter dissented in this case and argued that the majoritys holding limiting the district courts remedial authority was contrary to the precedent established in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).